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No. 70-7 5 
Moose Lodge No . 107 v. Irvis 
Appeal from USDC tvJD Pa (Freedman, Sheridan, Nealon) 
The Loyal erder of Hoose has a clause in its charter that 
limits membership to white people who are not married to non-
caueasians. In other words neither a black man nor a wh4.te 
man who is mar~d to a non-white, may be a member. At the 
time that the events giving rise to this lawsuit took place, 
race of/ 
there was no clause limiting the guests of members,x~xxkex 
1:1! but in practice t:he local lodge in Harrisburg would not :s:exxx 
permit non-whites to be guests of members in the lodge building. 
Since that time, the national charter has been ammended to 
prohibit members from having non-whites as guests . :i:Llt The 
-----
CONTROLLING CASES: Reitman v. Hulkey , 387 U.S. i~ 369; 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715; Shelley 










Pa Liquor Control Board has authority to issue a limited 
number of liquor licenses to private clubs so that they can 
operate bars for their members. Only members may buy drinks . 
The Board has discretion to issue the license or not, and 
it is prevented by local option from issu~ng licenses in 
some cities. To obtain and keep a liquo\i~~cense, a~ applicant 
must comply with extensive requirements--H~ must make physical 
changes in the premises if the Board requires, file a list 
of members, conform financial arrangements to statutory requirements, 
keep extensive records, prevent persons of il1 repute from 
frequenting the premises, not allow lewd or immoral entertainment, 
pennit inspection at any time, and in general be a person of 
so that 
good repute~NXWNNm the issuance of a license will not be 
detremental x~ to the welfare, health, peace, and morals of 
the neighborhood. Among these requirements--set out at length 
in appellee's brief at 46-56--is the specific requ~ment that 
clubs HN adhere strictly to their charters or constitutions. 
It is admitted that this is to prevent ~x~xxx~KR commercial 
establishments from passing themselves off as clubs, but in 
this case the requirement means that the Moose must comply with 
their racist charter . At any rate, the Moose do not dispute 
that they discriminate ENKNXXN against blacks both as to who 
can become a member and as to whom may be a member's guest. 
Specifically, this lodge refused to serve a drink to 
fl\ 
Irvis when he was brought to the Harrisburg lodge by a meber 
1\ 
in good standing. E fact 
that Irvis is 
Pa and K®NgNg sought the convening of a 3-judge court to 
tA 








clubs like the ~loose with racist membership and guest policies 
obtained liquor licenses was state action which deprived blacks 
of equal protection of the laws. The district court found that 
there was state action, and since the racial discrimination -was undisputed, it ~XN~X~NXKNRxR~~XNXK~ declared the KN lodge's 
liquor license to be invalid and directed the board fx~m to 
canceill the license. 
-----~ .... 
It further enjoined the Board from issuing 
any club liquor licenses to the lodge as long as it followed 
a policy of racial discrimination in its membership or ~~~x~xi~N 
operating policies or practices. The lodge sought to modify 
the decree so that it applied to them only if they discriminated 
racially with respect to their operations and not with respect 
to membership. They said that the district court had no 
reason to rule on their racist membership policies because 
Irvis had not applied for membership and indicated that he had 
no intention of applying for membership. But the district 
court refused to so modify. The ledge appealed to this Court 
directly. The Court has postponed the N determination as to 
its jurisdiction over this appeal until the NR~xi~N hearing 
on the merits. 
STANDING ON APPEAL 
Appeallants doe not deny that the complaint below was a 
proper case for a three-judge court.They argue, however, that 
~ 
there now is no case or controversy beeaoose of the refusal 
of Irvis to ~N agree to their proposed modification of the 
decree. Since Irvis has nox intention, and never had, of 







controversy EXR between them and Irvii over their membership 
policies. Thus Irvis shows no damage resulting from those 
policies. Therefore they say the decree below gives Irvis 
no relief, that there is no case or controvesry, and that 
the case should E therefore be remanded with an order to dismiss 
I\ 
it.ixx:Xx 
Irvis's response to this argument is not very satisfying. 
f!J;J seems to say that as a black, he is injured by a 1 iquor 
license~.:fo.a club~& with a racist membership policy. And that 
the discrimination he suffered arose out of these policies. 
What appellant is actually trying to argue is that while 
Irvis may have had standing to ENXXX!RgN challenge the XEg 
lodge's policy KN concerning member's guests, he had no standing 
to challenge their membership policies because he did not 
seek to join. Nor did he sue as a taxpayer. I am not sure 
where this gets appellant. At best, it seems to me that, assuming 
that Irvis prevails on the state action question, appellant 
would be entitled only to a modification of the decree below 
limiting it NK to the operating policies toward guests. But, 
as far as I know, x~~x appellant has never xx:X~xxxx!R stipulated 
that the district court was correct inx N ruling that its 
policy toward member's guests was state action in violation of 
the equal ~N protection clauseo And even if the local lodge 
has stipulated that they will now admit blacks if they are 
guests of member~, the intervening amendment of the national 
charter to forbid such a guest policy, would seem to NNxxxg~ 
nullify that XN stipulation--particularly since the lodge is 





there remains a case or controversy over the mem guest policy 
of appellants which Irvis has standing to raise. 
As a practical matter, that m throws the merits of 
the entire case into the Court's lap. If the Court rules 
that there is state action here because of the involvement 
of the liquor board and the issuance of a liquor license, 
than the membership policies would soon fall in a lawsuit 
brought by a black who had sought membership. 'fk Horeover, 
~mixe it seems to me that the membership rule and the guest 
rule are tied in together. When Irvis was refused service, 
there was no rule that said that blacks could not be the 
guests of members. That rule existed de facto, however, 
,., 
because of the mebership rule. It irs: is as if the club had 
II 
a rule that ~ that no blacks may be members or the guests 
of members. A black who had been denied either membership 
or service as a guest, would seem to have standing to challenge 
the entire rule. 
If only on the question of its guest policy, however, 
will serve all guests of members except those guests who are 
non-Caucasian? 
STATE ACTION 
The 14th Amendment provides that "nor shall any State 
• • • deny to any person within its jurisdic·t ion the equal 
protection of xxk the laws. 
Court held that the Amedmnet n 
In the Civil_Rights Cases this 
prohibited only discrimmnatory 









of the s~ate action doct~ine. In the fall of xi 1967, &Naxxe~ 
Charle~ Bl!;k wf wrote that since 1906, xNxe there had been ~ 
no case in which the Supreme Court has held N that a claim ~ 
under the equal protection clause against racial discrimination~\ 
must fail because EfxxNexakx~N«~XEf state R«XEXR«XX~Nx action Qll! 7 
is aka~~NKXEX absent or present in insufficient kind or ammount • 
to implicate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. 
To my kNEx knowledge, there has been no case since 1967 to 
contradict Rxa«k~ Black 's assertion. 
The state action doctrine, therefore, has been developed in 
a series of cases which have almost all found that state action 
did in fact exist. But when is the involvement of the state, -
state action, for the st~ :i::a is almost inevitably involved ~ Y--- ~ ~-~ 
~ v {; a cer~a in extent? Regrettably perhaps , it turns out that .r1t 
. ~ ~ there · is no k test, no bright-line rule. In fact, state action ,.,;L, 
~~ - ~~ 
t;/ .t\ is not a doctrine but a conclusion. Like poronography, the 
~ 
term has avoided all N~fXN:i::x attempts at definition. This 
point is best illustrated by quoting x~mx from two &f the 
recent state action cases: 
"[T]o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition 
of state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause 
is an 'impossible task' which X ' This Court has never 
attempted.' ••• Only bY sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the 
State in private conduct be attributed x~ its true 
signigiuance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 
365 U.S. at 722. 
"This Court has never attempted the :i:: 'impossible task' 
of formulating an infallible test for determining whether 
the State ' in any of its manifestations' has become 
( 
significantly involved in private discriminations. ~ENX~ 
' Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances' on 
a case-by-case basis can a'non-obviou$ involvement 
.. 
-7-
of the state in private conduct be attributed its true 
significance."' Reitman v. Nulkey , 387 U.S. at 378. 
The question, then, is one of degree or "significance". I - -
think that there are t'.vo ways to approach the resoluction of 
that question in the case before you. 
The first, and most obvious, is to look at the xf fact 
situations of the cases in which the Court has found state 
action to see if there is an anal6gy or more likely, to 
see if there are any cases in which the xxxx~xx~xx~Nx~xxxx 
inv~ement of thex state was less than the involvement here 
but in which the Court nevertheress found state action. 
If state action has been found in a lesser case, than it 
exists here, too. What follows x is a capsule summary of 
• 
·the cases. 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 
345 U.S. 461 (1953): Membership requirements of the Texas 
Democratic Party neither authorized nor prohibited by the 
state were nevertheless state action.xNE 
Evans v. Newton , 382 U.S. 296 (1966): MxxNXXN State action 
was found when xx~xxkxx~fxxx~xxk land left in a will for wk the ,, ,, 
use as a park by white people only had been maintained by the - -
city as a trustee. At the x~im time of the suit, the city had 
resigned as a trustee of the park, ENxxxxxx~xx~xi~Nxwxx rather 
than run it on a segregated bas is, but state ac]\ ion was nonetheless 
found. 
~~ $helly v. Kraemer , 334 U.S. 1(1948): 
pm.ver of a 
Use of the judicial 
blacks • 
.tJarsh found in the 
practices of a company toan--owned and operated by a company and 




R Burton v. Wilmington Parkigg Authori!Y_, 365 ' U.S. 715 (1961). 
~1\.x"XXII:KX" The discriminatory 
~-~ space in a building owned by 
practices of a restaurant that leased 
a state agency constituted state 
~~ action. ~..,......-
~ Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964): A private amusement -
park's use of a private, uniformed policeman, who had beed 
:&~e deputized by thea state, to enforce is racially discriminatory 
practices, constituted state action. 
Public Utilities Comm' fl-Y..!_ Pollak, 3t:~3 U.S. 451 (1952): 
A monopolisticf bus company, regulated by the state, constituted 
2 
state action. 
Reitman v. l'lulk~, 387 U.S. 369 (1967): Repeal of a 
state fair housing law by means of a state constitutional 
·amemendment providing that the state may not abridge the right 
of a~ person to sell or rent to whoever he chooses con~tituted 
state action. 
~ Amalgamated Food Employees MNixi:x Union Local 590 v. 
Logan Valley Plaza: Banning of pickets by means of trespass -= 
law on property of large shopping center serving as a community -
business block, freely open to persons passing thooughJwas 
state action protected by 14th Amenment. 
It is clear to me from all xkix these cases that the eourt 
will look to what is actually happening and not to xke form. 
Thus, state inaction can be state action in situtaions where 
the state tolerates or encourages by its inaction racial 
discrimination. Thus, when Califor~enacted a seemingly 
neutral amen~ent ~ to its constitution repealing fair housing 
1\ 
laws, the Court xa~ saw this as state action authorizing racial 
j .. 
" ;. ·,·· 
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discrimination. \~en instead of using its power as a trustee 
to end discrimination in a racially discriminatory park the 
city resign~d, that was state action. When it permitted a 
restaraunt to operate in a state owned EMXX!i:Nx building without 
preventing that restaurant from discriminating against blacks, 
that was state action. Regardless of the form it takes, including 
inaction, if the state encourages or supports racial discrimination, 
there is state action. 
~ Permitting xN~XMMMK~XKMXM~exaxexa a racist club to have the 
benefit of a liquor license in a system of regulation which 
would have clearly allowed the state to forbid racial discrimination 
is also state action. Indeed, the state in this case has -
determined that the bigots who run ·the lodge are of "good moral 
character" or else they would not have been eligible for a 
license, Furthermore , it requires them to strictly comply 
with the membership restrictions of their racist charter. 
To test the conclusion that state action is involved here, ask 
yourself if the xxax~ Board could have a regulation that says 
"it shall not be a ground for denial of a liquor liences that 
a private club does not admit Negores to membersfuip.;f? I 
submit that the HNK~x answer is obviously that such a regulation 
would be state action that was prohbited by the 14th am~N~m 
amendment. Reitman v. Mulk~ would almost certainly control. 
But there is no difference in effect between the state's 
having such a regulation Mx in writing or having a de facto 
policy that ~MN does the same thinkg, Pa does have the latter 
and therefore is engaged in state action that denies equal 





If you find no sustenance in this conceptual wasteland 
hD~ 
fNx ~ xkllt the kind of case analysis in which I have just 
attempted to engage, there is I suggest another approach 
) J 
to this case. Recognizing the intellectual bankruptcy of 
state action as a line-drawing mechanism, xk~xxkxNgx:KNXNNxxxxxx 
reco~nizing that there is some state invovlement, and recog-
nizing that, as a historical fact, state action can generally~ 
be found, ask yourself what value there is that needs to be ~ 
protected by a finding of no state action. What is the value ~ 
~,~ 
that mNKXXN~ is imporatant enough to prevent the &NNKKXXNKXNN  
C f . h h c . . h' b' h . P"f"' ourt rom say~ng t at t e onst~tut~on pro ~ ~ts t ese rac~stx 
JI!X policies? 
The brief of appellant supplies us with only one answer: 
privacy or the right to associate with whom one pleases and --not to associate with those he chooses not lltxg to. Note , that 
this is a somewhate unusual kind of privacy. We are not concerned 
here with what a man does alone, or his right to be left alone, 
or his right NN to keep the state from NNXN interfering 
with what he does in his own Eef bedroom. Most of the privacy 
arguments advanced in these kinds of cases assume that it is 
that kind of priuacy that must be protected and that will be 
xkx~ax~lli:Nx threatened by an expansive interpretation of state 
action. Thus, the horribles that are generally JI!~X paraded 
before us are requirmng an individual to XNXX invite somewne 
to dinner, or in this case, requiring a NNX white man who takes 
out a marriage license to marry a black woman. No one advocates 
this; no one is filing lawsuits NX to achieve those ends; and if 
someone ever does file such a suit, :Kk~x~ few courts would have 
" 
-11-
trouble dismissing it out of hand. 
ffiv. 
Instead what Rxxx appellants talk about is ~ right 
to x:s::s:l8!EXXKRXXNXXXX~!RX~Xl8!N :s: be left alone when they assoc.i,ate 
in large groups . I would not deny that there is a legitimate 
consideration here, but that consdieration is limited to the 
RXKRN~ extent that they involve the state in those groups / 
And I think it is legitimate to say that when racial discrimination 
is involved, the right of the minority not to have the state 
involved in that siscirimination outweighs the right of the 
large groups to the privacy of their associations. Privacy 
has never been an absolute right guaranteed under the Constitution; 
indeed some, notably Justice Black , never acknowledged the 
existance of such a right. No one denies the right to be ~ 
free from state involvement in discriminatory practices. 
~ 
t~oever xrbn&x.Kx we are not xxx±k talking here about a 
with no sta~e involvement 
situtation where a truly private group/seeks to exclude blacks. 
Nor are we concerned with a situtation in which the state 
requires that a private group admit E.KX!R blacks to membership. 
We are instead ±Nx concerned with .K the right of a group to 
,, ,, "? 
receive from the state a xxm±xR~ form of largess that only a 
l~ited ~mbe~~~s -may~ceive. That largess and the 
accompanying __ipu~J@Hln.t of the:s: state brings with it certain 
restrictions, among them the xxmx:KR~ prohibition against 
racial discrimination. If the association does not choose 
to accept thos restrictions, it is free to reject or not 
request the largesso But if they recieve the affirmative 
support 18!fXKNRX and endorsement of the state--as I think they 
do when they get a liquor license--than they may not exercise 
the kind of freedom that appellants RRk seek to exercise. 
•, 
-1-2 
Icannot see how the balance between the competing constitutional 
values--freedom of axx~«ixx±~Nxx privacy in choosing ones associates 
and freedom from racial discrimination can be struck any~ other 
way. 
X:M:K~xx~xRx There remain a few issues--I would call them 
xxx str~v men--thrown up by x~~Rxxxx~~Rxxx appellants against -
the kx possibility of finding state ac·tion in this case. 
First , appellants say that if a liquor license means state action, 
every x licesne,m!RHK including a building permit, means state 
action. It is obvious that this objection is a~ phony one insofar 
as it applies to the kind of liences, such as a marriage 
license ~for a driver's license, that is open to everyone 
who meets certain objective criteria. There is no state 
endorsement or allignment of the state with the persons who 
have such a lieense. And if this case is precdent for finding 
state action when other kinds of licenses--the kind that 
involve indorsement of someone's moral character, for example 
--are issued, so what? In fact, however, there are few kinds 
of licenses that invo~e such pervasive supervision as the 
kind of liquor license that appellants obtained from Pa . 
Since state action is essentially an ad hoc determination, 
distinctions can be made in future cases. 
Second., appellan·ts aay that if this xxxN!li ruling applies 
to racial restrictions on membership, it will also apply to 
religious or ethnic restrictions. Again, the first response 
is so what. How many protestants do you think would really 
try to join the Knights of Columbus? How many WASPs will 





' ' . ' .. 
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k cases, assuming the requisite state involvement, can be 
distinguished. First, because race is different . We know 
that E above all else, the 14th Amenment was designed to 
end racial discrimination . It may apply to other kinds of 
discrimination, but ~Rxk~~x not with the same force as it 
applies to racial discrimination . ~R~XNX Second , there is 
a probable method of distinction suggested in one of the 
briefs . Some kinds of :X membership limitations are reasonably 
related to the gNHXXXNX legitimately recognizable goals of 
an orga nization . For example , if the organization is designed 
to promote a ceratin religiouls doctrine , it makes sense to 
limit membership to persons who have expressed a belief in 
that doctrine by joining a church . But there is no legitimate 
purpose in basing mwm membership on raceu In this connection , 
it is interesting to note that one of the orgainzations 
cited by the Elks club in their amicus brief as an organization 
with selective membership qualifications , the B'nai B'rith , ' 
has filed an amicus brief in support of the opinion below 
except that it believes that the decision NNKk ought also 
apply to gx~~Mxxgx~~x groups that discriminate on religious 
grounds . (That brfV/f also makes the point that excluding 
someone from a men's club may have a substantial impact on 
his career if he is a business or professional man . ) 
Third , appellant asserts that the test applied below 
based on the pervasiee nature of the state's involvement 
with XR~±~~iNRx recipients of liquor lieenses , is vague and 





bright-line test for state action. 
Fourth, the argument that a liquor license is not a 
privilege granted by the state but a form of control is so 
much bull. The lodge has admitted that it will lose members 
and XRXRN!Rlll revenues if it has no license. Moreover, this 
argument proves to much. The very reason why state action 
is involved here while it may not be in other forms of 
licensing is that there is such control exercised by the xxxe 
state. :fx It might even be argued that liquor licensees are 
so controlled by the state xx that they are the state's agents 
for the supervision of liquor control . And it should be 
remembered that substantial revenues result to the state 
from the kX use Of these liquor XXXXXX~RNXRR licenses . 
Rf Fifth , Appellants argue that the 1964 Civil Rights 
a~xx Act somehow forecloses a finding of state action here . 
This argument is barely ~N: coherent . First , the 1964 Act 
was upheld by this Court as x an exercise of the Commerce 
Clause , not as an exercise of the Congress ' s ~ex powere to 
enact laws that enforce the 14th Amenment . Second , Congress 
does not claim--which it probably could not do Constitutionally--
that it has precisely demarcated the perameters of state action 
and when the equal protection clause is to be applied . 
The Congress could not enact legislation which would prevent 
the Court from ruling under the Constitution that x~x something 
was state action in violation E of the equal protection clause . 
Finally , N the appellants XN argue that even if there is 
a finding of state action , the mandate of the district court 
,. " 
-15-
is too braod because it need only have struck down the state 
regulation requiring private R:l::Na:N clubs to adhere to their 
charters. But it is clear that, on its fac~, there is nothing 
objectionable about that regulation. It cannot be singled 
out for scorn. Instead , it is the state involvement and 
implied endorsement of a racist organization that calls down 
the equal ~xNk~R:XiNiN protection clause on the Moose's heads 
(or perhaps horns). 
I do not suppose it would be accurate to say that I have 
hidden ~ my feelings on this particular issue. ~ I feel 
strongly that it would be a travesty not NX to affirm the 
decision below. I would approach state action,Xk not with 
a reluctance to find it and a requirement that the state 
XNXNXXRMN~ involvement in a discriminatory practice somehow 
surpass a vague measuring line. Rather , if there is any 
state invovlement whatsoever, and if there is racial discrimina-
tion, I would find state action unless there was a reason--
a R:NNsxXx constitutionally enshrined value--that pointed the 
other way. And if such a reason exi~ted, I would then attempt 
to weigh it against the value against racial discrimination, to 
which I attach much wm weight. In this case, the a:xkk~x 
alternate value can only be said to be the right to xxx limit 
. . ~ 
one's assocLatLons and~ take advantage of the largess of 
the state. That is an extended right which is based only 
vaguely in the Bill of Rights in the first place. I cannot 
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.i>u;vrtmt <ijo-ud of tJrt 'JRttittb ~hUts 
Jlasirtng~ ~. <ij. 20~'!-~ 
iE CHIEF JUSTICE April 20, 1972 
Re: No. 70-75 - Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis and 
Liquor Contro 1 Board of Pennsylvania 
Dear Bill: 
This wi 11 confirm reassignment to you for an 
opinion in the above. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
'·" .. 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS 
~u.;rrcmt <!Jcltrl of tfrt 'Jilttitt~ ~tatts 
J!rru;!p:n:gtcn:.. ~. <!J. 2'.(l~.l1~ 
April 22, 1972 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In No. 70-75 - Moose Lodge v. Irvis, I voted to reverse on the 
exception of "a private club" made by Congress in the 1964 Act. 
/ 
On further study I have decided that that ground is not tenable -
so I am changing my vote to affirm. 
·' 
··~ 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice B ,, rennan 
.~~~r. Justice St 
M J ewart 
r. Ustice Whit 
.llr J t e .ll . us ice Marshall 
~ustice Blackmun 
· Justice Powell 
2nd DRAFT 
From: Rehnquist, J. 
Circviated: C 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
' r culated: 
No. 70-75 
Moose Lodge No. 107, On Appeal from the United 
Appellant, States District Court for the 
v. Middle District of Pennsyl-
K. Leroy Irvis et al. vania. 
lJune -, 1972] 
MR. Jus'l'ICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Appellee Irvis, a N (fgro, was refused service by appel-
lant Moose Lodge, a local branch of the national fra-
ternal organization located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 
Appellee then brought this action under 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1983 for injunctive relief in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 
He claimed that because the Pennsylvania liquor board 
had issued appellant Moose Lodge a private club license 
that authorized the sale of alcoholic beverages on its 
premises, the refusal of service to him was "state action" 
for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. He named both Moose Lodge 
and the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority as defendants, 
seeking injunctive relief that would have required the 
defendant liquor board to revoke Moose Lodge's license 
so long as it continued its discriminatory practices. Ap-
pellee sought no damages. 
A three-judge district court, convened at appellee's 
request, upheld his contention on the merits, and entered 
a decree declaring invalid the liquor license issued to 
Moose Lodge "as long as it follows a policy of racial 
discrimination in its membership or operating policies 
-
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or practices." Moose Lodge alone a.ppealed from the 
decree, and \Ve postponed decision as to jurisdiction until 
the hearing on the merits, - U. S. -. Appellant 
urges in the alterna.tive that we either vacate the judg-
ment below because there is not presently a case or 
controversy between the parties, or that we reverse on 
the merits. 
I 
The District Court in its opinion found that "a Cau-
casian member in good standing brought plaintiff, a 
Negro, to the Lodge's dining room and bar as his guest 
and requested service of food and beverages. The Lodge 
through its employees refused service to plaintiff solely 
because he is a Negro." It is undisputed that each 
local Moose Lodge is bound by the constitution and 
general by-laws of the Supreme Lodge, the latter of which 
contains a provision limiting membership in the lodges 
to white male Caucasians. The District Court in this 
connection found that "the lodges accordingly maintain 
a policy and practice of restricting membership to the 
Caucasian race and permitting members to bring only 
Caucasian guests on lodge premises, particularly to tho 
dining room and bar." 
The District Court ruled in favor of appellee on his 
Fourteenth Amendment claim, and entered the pre-
viously described decree. Following its loss on the merits 
in the District Court, Moose Lodge moved to modify 
the final decree by limiting its eft"ect to discriminatory 
policies with respect to the service of guests. Appellee 
opposed the proposed modification, and the court denied 
the motion. 
The District Court did not find, and it could not have 
found on this record, that appellee had sought mem-
bership in Moose Lodge and been denied it. Appellant 
., 
' • i' 
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contends that because of this fact, appellee had no 
standing to litigate the constitutional issue respecting 
Moose Lodge's membership requirements, and that there-
fore the decree of the court below erred insofar as it 
decided that issue. 
Any injury to appellee from the conduct of Moose 
Lodge stemmed not from the lodge's membership re-
quirements, but from its policies with respect to the 
serving of guests of members. Appellee has standing 
to seek redress for injuries done to him, but may not seek 
redress for injuries clone to others. Yirginian Rail-
way v. Federation, 300 U. S. 515, 558 (1937); Erie 
Railroad Co. v. ·williams, 233 U. S. 685, 697. While 
this Court has held that in exceptiona1 situations a 
concededly injured party may rely on the constitutional 
rights of a third party in obtaining relief, Barrows v. 
Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953),1 in this case appellee-
was not inj urecl by Moose Lodge's membership policy 
since he never sought to become a member. 
Appellee relics on Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), 
·and Law St'Udents Research Co'Undl v. Wadmond, 401 
U. S. 154 ( 1971), to support the breadth of the District 
Court's decree. Flast v. Cohen held that a fcdera1 tax-
payer had standing qua taxpayer to challenge the ex-
penditure of federal funds authorized by Congress under 
the taxing and spending clause of the Constitution. 
The Court in Flast pointed out: 
"It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental 
expenditure of tax funds in the administration of 
an essentially regulatory statute. This require-
1 Our reeent opinion in 8ien·a Club v. 111m·ton,- U. S. -, re-
ferred to a similar rrla1ionship betwren the standing of the plaintiff 
and the argument of which he might aYail himself where judicia! 
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mentis consistent with the limitation imposed upon 
State-taxpayer standing in federal courts in Dore?nus 
v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952)." 392 
U. S., at 102. 
The taxpayer's claim in Flast, of course, 1ras that the 
proposed expenditure violated the establishment clause 
of the First Amendment to the Constitution, a clause 
which by its terms prohibits taxing and spending in aid 
of religion. 
The Court in Law Students Research Council v. Wad-
mond, supra, noted that while appellants admitted that 
no person involved in that litigation had been refused 
admission to the New York bar, they claimed that the 
existence of Now York's system of screening applicants 
for admission to the bar \vorked a chilling effect upon 
the free exercise of the rights of speech and association 
of students who must anticipate having to meet its 
requirements. The Court then went on to decide the 
merits of the students' contention. While the doctrine 
of "overbreadth" has been held by this Court in prior 
decisions to accord standing by reason of the "chilling 
effect" that a particular law might have upon the exer-
cise of the First Amendment rights, that doctrine has 
not been applied to constitutional litigation in areas 
other than those relating to the First Amendment. 
We believe that Moose Lodge is correct, therefore, in 
contending that the District Court in its decree went 
beyond the vindication of any claim that appellee had 
standing to litigate. Appellee did, however, have stand-
ing to litigate the constitutional validity of Moose 
Lodge's policies relating to the service of guests of mem-
bers. The language of the decree, insofar as it referred 
to Moose Lodge's "policy of racial discrimination against 
membership or operating policies or practices" is suffi-
ciently broad to encompass practices relating to the 
.. 
,. . ', 
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service of guests of mem.bers, as well as policies and 
practices relating to the acceptance of members. But 
Moose Lodge claims that, because of the position appel-
lee took on the motion to modify the decree, he in effect 
disclaimed any interest in obtaining relief based solely 
on the Lodge's practice with respect to serving the guests 
of members. 
Appellee in his brief on this point says: 
"[Moose Lodge's argument as to mootness] is based 
upon Moose Lodge's motion to modify the decree ... 
and somehow to allow it to change its operations 
and to permit Irvis to be brought to the Moose· 
Lodge's premises as a guest. But, as Irvis pointed 
out in his answer to this motion . . . nothing at 
all "·oulcl be changed even if this were done because 
the vice of racial discrimination arose from the 
privileges of membership, either those accruing to 
a person in his own enjoyment of them or those 
accruing to a person in his ability to bring a guest 
or guests to Moose Lodge. Nothing in the sug-
gested modification would make repetition impos-
sible because the fact that Irvis was a guest was 
purely happenstance. Whether he be barred be-
cause no member would invite him or because he 
has no opportunity to become a member, the situa-
tion remains unchanged." (Brief, at 41.) 
During oral argument of the case here, counsel for-
appellee was asked to explain why he opposed the mo-
tion to modify made in the lower court, and he responded 
as follows: 
" ... the motion to modify which would have al-
lmved Mr. Irvis or any others to be admitted as a 
guest would have done nothing to remove the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania from the discriminatory 
actions of the Moose Lodge. 
6 
70-75-0Pil\ION 
MOOSE LODGE NO. 107 v. IRVIS 
"That is, it still would have been a matter of 
being dependent upon a white member of the Moose 
Lodge to invite him there. It would have been 
a matter of no particular Negro being sure that 
the Moose Lodge \Yould or would not discriminate. 
The Commonweath of Pennsylvania would still be 
issuing that license to a discriminating private rlub. 
And I think it's worth noting that at the time this 
motion to modify ,,·as being presented, the Moose 
Lodge was in the process of amending its by-laws 
to forbid Negroes from being guests. So, at the 
same time they were sayi11g let us modify the decree 
so that we can admit Mr. Irvis as a guest, their 
by-laws were being amended to say no Negroes can 
come in as guests, let alone members. 
"We feel that the idea that he should then be 
allowed to come in as a guest through a mo<..lifica-
tion of the decree does not go to the heart of the 
problem. It does not supply the type of redress 
that we think cuts through the problem of State 
participation or support for the discrimination of 
the Moose Lodge, and that is why '"e oppose it." 
We arc loath to attach conclusive weight to the rela-
tively spontaneous responses of counsel to equally spon-
taneous questioning from thr Court during oral argu-
ment. However, upon examination of this ans",;er 
it reflects substantia.lly the same position as appellee 
took in his brief here. While it is possible to i11fer 
from these statements that appellee is simply not inter-
ested in obtaining any relief as to guest practices of 
Moose Lodge if he should prevail on the merits, it is 
equally possible to read them as being tactical argu-
ments designed to avoid having to settle for half a loaf 
when he might obtain the whole loaf. 
The mere refusal by appellee to consent to the pro-
posed amendment of the judgment by itself could not 
-·· 
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be construed as a waiver or disclaimer of injunctive re-
lief directed solely to Moose Lodge's practice with re-
spect to the service of guests. Appellee's complaint, 
while directed primarily at membership policies of Moose 
Lodge, con taincd a customary prayer for other relief 
which was broad enough to embrace relief with respect 
to the practices of the lodge in serving guests of mem-
bers. The District Court in its decree used language 
that was clearly broad enough to include such prac-
tices. as well as the membership policies of Moo c Lodge. 
Having thus prayed for such relief in his complaint, 
and having obtained it from the District Court, nothing 
less than an explicit renunciation of a.ny claim or desire 
for such relief here would justify our concluding that 
there was no longer a case or controversy with respect 
to Moose Lodge's practices in serving guests of mem-
bers. We do not believe that a fair reading of appellee's 
argument in opposition to the motion to amend the 
judgment belo'"' or of the statements made in his brief 
and oral argument here, amount to such an explicit 
renunciation. 
Because appellee had no standing to litigate a con-
stitutional claim arising out of Moose Lodge's member-
ship practices, the District Court erred in reaching that 
issue on the merits. But it did not err in reaching the 
constitutional claim of appellee that Moose Lodge's guest 
service practices under these circumstances violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in the positions taken 
by the parties since the entry of the District Court 
decree has mooted that claim, and we therefore turn 
to its disposition. 
II 
Moose Lodge is a private club in the ordinary mean-
ing of that term. It is a local chapter of a national 
fraternal organization having \rell defined requirements 
for membership. It conducts all of its activities in a 
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building that is owned by it. It is not publicly funned. 
Only members and guests are permitted in any lodge 
of the order; one may become a guest only by invita-
tion of a member or upon invitation of the house 
committee. 
Appellee, while conceding the right of private clubs 
to choose members upon a discriminatory basis, asserts 
that the licensing of Moose Lodge to serve liquor by 
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board amounts to such 
State involvement with the club's activities as to make 
its discriminatory practices forbidden by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
relief sought and obtained by appellee in the District 
Court was an injunction forbidding the licensing by 
the liquor authority of Moose Lodge until it ceased 
its discriminatory practies. We conclude that Moose 
Lodge's refusal to serve food and beverages to a guest 
by reason of the fact that he was a Negro does not, 
under the circumstances here presented, violate the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
In 1883, this Court in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U. S. 3, set forth the essential dichotomy between dis-
criminatory action by the State, which is prohibited 
by the Equal Protection Clause, and private conduct, 
"however discriminatory or wrongful," against which 
that clause "erects no shield," Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U. S. 1, 13 (1948). That dichotomy has been subse-
quently reaffirmed in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, and in 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 
(1951). 
While the principle is easily stated, the question of 
whether particular discriminatory conduct is private, on 
the one hand, or amounts to "State action," on the other 
hand, frequently admits of no easy answer. "Only by 
sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-
obvious involvement of the State in private conduct 
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be attributed its true significance." Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority, supra., at 772. 
Our cases make clear that the impetus for the for-
bidden discrimination need not originate with the State 
if it is state actio11 that enforces privately originated 
discrimination. Shelley v. Kraemer, supra. The Court 
held in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra,.. 
that a private restaurant owner who refused service be-
cause of a customer's race violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, where the restaurant was located in a 
building owned by a state created parking authority 
and leased from the authority. The Court, after a com-
prehensive review of the relationship between the lessee· 
and the parking authority concluded that the latter had 
"so far insinuated itself into a position of interdepend-
ence with Eagle [the restaurant owner] that it must 
be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged 
activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered 
to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the· 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment." 365 U.S., at 725. 
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimina-
tion by an otherwise private entity would be violative 
of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity 
receiVes any sort of benefit or service at all from the 
State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree 
whatever. Since state-furnished services include such 
necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and fire 
protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the 
distinction between private a.s distinguished from State 
conduct set forth in The Civil Rights Cases, supra, and 
adhered to in subsequent decisions. Our holdings in-
dicate that where the impetus for the discrimination is 
private, the State must have "significantly involved it-
self with invidious discriminations," Reitman v. Mulkey, 
387 U. S. 369, 380 ( 1967), in order for the discriminatory 
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Our prior decisions dealing ",:ith discriminatory re-
fusal of service in public eating places are siguificantly 
different factually from the case now before us. Peter-
sonY. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1063), dealt with 
trespass prosecution of persons \Yho "sat in" at a restau-
rant to protest its refusal of service to ~egroes. There 
the Court held that although the ostensible initiative 
for the trespass prosecution came from the proprietor, 
the existence of a local ordinance requiring segrega-
tion of races in such places was tantamount to the State 
having "commanded a particular result," 373 U. S., at 
248. \Vith one exception, which is discussed h1jra, at 
13-15, there is no suggestion in this record that the Penn-
sylvania statutes and regulations governing the sale of 
liquor arc intended either overtly or coYertly to encour-
age discrimination. 
In Burton, supra, the Court's full discussion of the 
facts in its opinion indicates the significant differences 
between that case and this: 
"The land and building were publicly owned. As 
an entity, the building was dedicated to 'public 
uses' in performance of the Authority 's 't>sscntial 
governmental functions.' rcitation omitted.l The 
costs of land acquisition, construction. and main-
tenance arc defrayed entirely from donations by the 
City of \rilmington, from loans and rrvenue bonds 
and from the proceeds of rentals and parking srrv-
icrs out of which the loans and bonds were payable. 
Assuming that the distinction would be significant 
[citation omittedj the commercially leased areas \Yere 
not surplus state property, but constituted a physi-
cally and financially integral and, indeed, indispens~ 
able part of the State's plan to operate its project 
as a self-sustaining unit. Upkeep and maintenance 
of the building, including necessary repa.irs, "·ere 
, .~ t .. 
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responsibilities of the Authority and \\·ere payable 
out of public funds. It cannot be doubted that the 
peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the park-
ing facility in ,,·hich it is located confers on each 
an incidental variety of mutual benefits. Guests of 
the restaurant arc afforded a convenient place to 
park their automobiles, even if they cannot enter 
the restaurant directly from the parking area. Sim-
ilarly, its convenience for diners may well provide 
additional demand for the Authority's parking fa-
cilities. Should any im provemcnts effected in the 
leasehold by Eagle become part of the realty, there 
is no possibility of increased taxes being passed on 
to it since the fcc is held by a tax exempt govern-
ment agency. Neither can it be ignored, especially 
in view of Eagle's affirmative allegation that for it 
to serve Negroes would injure its business, that 
profits earned by discrimination not only contribute 
to, but also arc indispensable clements in, the fi-
nancial success of a government agency." 365 
U. S., at 723-724. 
Here there is nothing approaching the symbiotic rela-
tionship between lessor and lessee that was present in 
Burton, where the private lessee obtained the benefit 
of locating in a building owned by the State created park-
ing authority, and the parki11g authority was enabled to 
carry out its ])l'imary public purpose of furnishing park-
ing space by advantageously leasing portions of the 
building constructed for that purpose to commercial 
lessees such as the owner of the Eagle Restaurant. Un-
like Burtun, the Moose Lodge building is located on land 
owned by it, not by any public authority. Far from 
apparently holding itself out as a place of public ac-
commodation, Moose Lodge quite ostentatiously pro-
70-75-0PIKIO~ 
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claims the fact that it is not open to the public at large.? 
Nor is it located and operated in such surroundings 
that although private in name, it discharges a function 
or performs a service that would othenvise in all likeli-
hood be performed by the State. In short, while Eagle 
"·as a public restaurant in a public building, Moose 
Lodge is a private social club in a private building. 
With the exception hereafter noted, the Pennsylvania 
Liquor Control Board plays absolutely no part in estab-
lishing or enforcing the membership or guest policies of 
the club which it licenses to serve liquor. There is no 
suggestion in this record that the Pennsylvania Act, 
either as written or as applied, discriminates against 
minority groups either in their right to apply for club 
licenses themselves or in their right to purchase and be 
served liquor in places of public accommodation. The 
only effect that the state licensing of Moose Lodge to 
serve liquor can be said to have on the right of any other 
Pennsylvanian to buy or be served liquor on premises 
other than those of Moose Lodge is that for some pur-
poses club licenses are counted in the maximum number 
of licenses which may be issued in a given municipality. 
Basically each municipality has a quota of one retail 
license for each 1,500 inhabitants. Licenses issued to 
hotels, municipal golf courses and airport restaurants 
are not counted in this quota, nor are club licenses until 
the maximum number of retail licenses is reached. Be-
yond that point, neither additional retail licenses nor 
additional club licenses may be issued so long as the 
number of issued and outstanding retail licenses re-
mains above the statutory maximum. 
~The Pennsyh·rrnia courts have found that Lora! 107 i~ not a 
"place of public accommodation" within the term~ of the Pennsyl-
vania Human Relations Act, 43 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann.§§ 951 ct seq. 
Pennsylvania IIwnan Relations Commission Y. 'The Loyal Order of 
Moose, Lodge No. 107,- Pa. D&C 2d -, aff'cl,- Pa. Ruper. -. 
•' 
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The District Court was at pains to point out in its 
opinion what it considered to be the "pervasive" nature 
of the regulation of private clubs by tho Pennsylvania 
Liquor Control Board. As that court noted, an appli-
cant for a club license must make such physical altera-
tions in its premises as the board may require, must 
file a list of the names and addresses of its members and 
employees, and must keep extensive financial records~ 
The board is granted the right to inspect the licensed 
premises at any time when patrons, guests or members 
are present. 
However detailed this type of regulation may be in 
some particulars, it cannot be said to in any way foster 
or encourage racial discrimination. Nor can it be said 
to make the State in any realistic sense a partner or even 
a joint venturer in the club's enterprise. The limited 
effect of the prohibition against obtaining additional 
club licenses when the maximum number of retail li-
censes allotted to a municipality has been issued, when 
considered together with the availability of liquor front 
hotel, restaurant, and retail licensees falls far short of 
conferring upon club licensees a monopoly in the dis-
pensing of liquor in any given municipality or in the 
State as a whole. We therefore hold that, with the 
exception hereafter noted, the operation of the regulatory 
scheme enforced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control 
Board does not sufficiently implicate the State in the 
discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge so as to 
make the latter "State action" within the ambit of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The District Court found that the regulations of the 
Liquor Control Board adopted pursuant to statute af-
firmatively require that "every club licensee shall adhere 
to all the provisions of its constitution and by-laws." 3 
3 Regulations of i.hc Pcnnsyh·ania Liquor Control Board § 113.09• 
(June 1970 ed.) . 
.. . 
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Appellant argues that the purpose of this provision "is 
purely and simply and plainly the prevention of sub-
terfuge," pointing out that the bona fides of a private 
club, as opposed to a place of public accommodation 
masquerading as a private club, is a matter with which 
the State Liquor Control Board may legitimately concern 
itself. Appellee concedes this to be the case, and ex-
presses disagreement with the District Court on this 
point. There can be no doubt that the label "private 
club" can and has been used to evade both regulations 
of State and local liquor authorities, and statutes re-
quiring places of public accommodation to serve all 
persons without regard to race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin. This Court in Dam'el v. Paul, 395 U. S. 
298 (1969), had occasion to address this issue in connec-
tion with the application of Title IT of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a et seq. 
The effect of this particular regulation on Moose Lodge 
under the provisions of the constitution placed in the 
record in the court below would be to place State sanc-
tions behind its discriminatory membership rules, but not 
behind its guest practices, which were not embodied in 
the constitution of the lodge. Had there been no change 
in the relevant circumstances since the making of the 
record in the District Court, our· holding in Part I of this 
opinion that appellee has standing to challenge only the 
guest practices of Moose Lodge would have a bearing on 
our disposition of this issue. Appellee stated upon oral 
argument, though, and Moose Lodge conceded in its 
Brief • that the bylaws of the Supreme Lodge have been 
altered since the lower court decision to make applicable 
to guests the same sort of racial restrictions as are pres-
ently applicable to members.5 
.tAt p. 10. 
5 Section 92.1 of the General Law~ of the Loyal Order of l\Ioose 
presently provides in relevant part as follows: 
"Sec. 92.1-To Prevent Admission of Non Members-There shall 
'• . ' 
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Even though the Liquor Control Board regulation in 
question is neutral in its terms, the result of its applica-
tion in a case where the constitution and by-laws of a 
club required racial discrimination would be to invoke 
the sanctions of the State to enforce a concededly dis-
criminatory private rule. State action, for purposes of 
the Equal Protection Clause, may emanate from rulings 
of administrative and regulatory agencies as well as from 
legislative or judicial action. Robinson v. Florida, 378 
U.S. 153, 156 (1964). Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, makes 
it clear that the application of state sanctions to enforce 
such a rule ·would violate the }-,ourteenth Amendment. 
Although the record before us is not as clear as one would 
like, appellant has not persuaded us that the District 
Court should have denied any and all relief. 
Appellee was entitled to a decree enjoining the enforce-
ment of § 113.09 of the regulations promulgated by the 
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board insofar as that regu-
lation requires compliance by Moose Lodge with pro-
visions of its constitution and by-laws containing racially 
discriminatory provisions. He was entitled to no more. 
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the 
cause remanded with instructions to enter a decree in 
conformity with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
never at any time be admitted to any soci ::tl club or home maintained 
or operated by any lodge, any person who is not a member of some 
lodge in good standing. The House Committee may grant guest 
privileges to persons who are eligible for membership in the fraternity 
consistent with governmental laws and regulations. A member shall 
accompany such gueHt and shall be responsible for the actions of said 
f!Uest, and upon the member leaving, the guest must also leave. It 
is the duty of each member of the Order when so requested to sub-
mit for inspection his receipt for dues to any member of any House 




MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL 
Re: No. 70-75, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis 
Justice Rehnquist has circulated in this 
know I disagree with the result, but I think he has done a 
good job. He says that appellee had no standing to challenge 
the membership rules of appellant because he never applied 
for membership and indicated that he never intended to do so. 
He does have standing to challenge the guest policies. 
These are upheld because of an absence of state action. 
State action is said to be state enforcement of dsicrimination 
or state involvement in a discriminatory scheme, even though 
the state itself does not initiate the discrimination. This 
is all said to be a matter of degree, and Justice Rehnquist 
concludes that the state involvement in this scheme was not 
sufficient to constitute state action. He does think that 
the state liquor board can be enjoined from enforcing its 
regulation requiring licensees to comply with their constitutions 
if the constitutions contain discriminatory policies because 
that is state enforcement of private discrimination which has 
been condemned since the case of Shelly v. Kramer. 
The approach is, it seems to me, correct given the 
past precedents of this Court. I only disagree with application 
in this factual setting. It seems to me that the state involvement 
through a complex x«eme scheme of regulation of liquor licensees 
is equal to its involvement in the Wilmington Parking AuthQ£ity 
case in which the state leased space in a state building to 
a restaurant that discriminated. My approach is that given 
'y 
-2-
the fact that the existence of state action turns on a matter 
of degree and given that there is some state involvement, an 
examination should be made to see if there are any counter-
vailing constitutional values that would argue against a 
finding of state action. In this case, the only such values 
asserted is the right of association, but surely that value 
is upheld by permitting persons to choose on an individual 
basis with whom to associate without discriminating against 
an entire class of people for irrational reasons. This seems 
to me to be particularly true when the class is blacks whose 
protection against discrimination is particularly enshrined 
in the Constitution. This is not at all analagous to the 
case of groups organized to promote various religious or 
political principles who admit as members only those persons 
who also adhere to those principals. That it seems to me 
is a rational classification which does not violate the 
equal protection clause. 
Jl assume, however, that you do not agree with that 
analysis. I think you can join Justice Rehnquist without 
















CHAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
..§tqrrrmr ~,,mt ,lf ti! r ';llnitdl .§tatr.t.i 
';lliaslriltgton, p. <!j:. 2'llp >h;3 
June 2, 1972 
70-75 - Moo ;~G Lodge v 0 Irvis et al. 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in this case. Although the opinion 
probably makes it clear enough already, I 
wonder whether it might not be a good idea, 
in this Sf'nsitive area, to emphasize explicit-
ly that n ither the State nor any of its 
agencies has in any way approved, endorsed, 
accepted, or supported the racially discrim-
inatory constitution, by-laws, or practices 
of the appellant 0 Compare Public Utilities 





Mr 0 Justice Rehnquist 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 5, 1972 
Re: No. 70-75 -Moose Lodge No. 107 
v. Irvis 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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1'llaglrhl~!!,• n, p. <!J. 211§'1;1 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 7, 1972 
r. . ' 
' I ' 
Re: No. 70-75 - Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis 
Dear Bill: 





















THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
~u:p-rmu ~ou:rt of tqt 'Jilttittb ,jtattg. 
'JJID'~sqhtghm. J:B. ~· 2.0.;iJ!.~ 
June 8, 1972 
Re: No. 70-75 - Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
~egards, 
Lu~1) 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
j 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§u:vrttttt <!Jcnrt cf tqt ~ttittb' ~tatttt 
'JAA'tw:Jringtcn. ~. <!J. 20.?'1-;:t ' 
1USTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 8, 1972 
Re: No. 70-75 Moose Lodg~- No. 107 v. Irvis 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
;! [i.6 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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